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Abstract 
The paper’s purpose is to quantify the performance of a State in its action as 
a de facto LBO specialist, taking companies private to restructure them and 
subsequently reselling them in the share market. A sample comprising all the 
listed companies nationalized in Portugal in 1975 and 1976 that were 
subsequently privatised through a relisting by means of a share issue is 
constructed. The returns earned by the Portuguese Republic are computed, 
comparing the market values of nationalised companies at the time of their 
privatization with their theoretical value in a non-nationalization scenario. A 
negative abnormal return for the Portuguese Republic’s investment in shares 
is found. This negative return is much worse than the ones computed in 
similar work for France. 
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1. Introduction 
In a leveraged buyout, investors take a company private, with a view to 
recapitalize it, restructure it, and, eventually, take it public again. In most 
cases, those investors, usually termed “LBO specialists”, are privately-
funded and privately-owned organizations. Nevertheless, a few situations 
occurred in which States took the role of LBO specialists, issuing public 
debt to take a sizeable number of companies private, and to eventually take 
them public again. These uncommon situations occurred twice in Europe in 
recent years: in France between 1982 and 1999, and in Portugal between 
1975 and 2003.  
 
In both cases, the State opted for nationalizations in a timing (late seventies, 
early eighties) where State ownership of companies was becoming a less 
popular choice among political leaders. After World War II, most 
mainstream economists (for instance, the Nobel Prize winners Allais [1947],  
Meade [1948] and Lewis [1949]) were generally in favour of State 
ownership
[1]
.  As time went by, economists began to increasingly favour 
regulated private ownership (Niskanen [1971], Buchanan [1972], Vickers 
and Yarrow [1988]). Influenced by these theories, politicians took to a 
privatizing stance that triggered a global privatization wave, usually referred 
to as beginning with the privatization of British Petroleum, in 1979.
[2]
 
 
Although this privatization wave spread over the planet rather quickly, 
specific political circumstances in Portugal and France caused an opposite 
move. The Portuguese Revolution of 1974, following a pro-communist 
military coup, led to a nationalization wave (in 1975 and 1976) and to the 
closing of the Lisbon Exchange between 1974 and 1977 (Alpalhão [2010]). 
In 1981, the socialist victory in the French elections also led to generalized 
nationalizations (Langhör and Viallet [1986]). In both cases, a large and 
spread over the entire economy State-owned sector emerged.  
 
The combination of rather disappointing operating results and of an 
international environment where States were privatizing rather than 
nationalizing eventually led the French and Portuguese governments to 
reverse their buyouts in the market. French privatizations started in 1987 
and Portuguese privatizations in 1989. The end result of this nationalization 
– privatization sequence was to make the French and Portuguese States take 
the de facto role of an LBO specialist in their domestic stock markets. This 
raises the question, addressed in this paper, of how do the States’ experience 
compare with that of the privately-owned LBO specialist that took 
companies private and later did reverse LBO, taking the acquired companies 
public again. Do the States fare well as LBO specialists, or poorly? 
 
The French experience has been documented in the literature in Dumontier 
and Laurin (2003). In this paper, we draw conclusions from the dataset of 
the Portuguese nationalization and privatization sequence. The second 
section describes the methodology, the third the dataset, and the fourth 
computes value changes over the process and concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
We aim at documenting the return on the Portuguese State’s investment in 
shares of companies taken private in the nationalization wave of 1975-76, 
and then public again from 1989 on. This return translates into a wealth 
transfer from all Portuguese citizens to the purchasers of shares in the 
State’s privatization offers. If the return is positive, the Portuguese citizens 
in general gain; if it is negative, this wealth transfer is detrimental to 
Portuguese citizens that did not acquire shares in the privatization offers. 
 
To compute these returns, we compare the market values of nationalized 
companies at the time of their privatization with their theoretical value in a 
non-nationalization scenario. This approach is identical to Dumontier and 
Laurin  (2003), although not the most commonly used approach in the 
literature. Most authors tend to compare the performance of State-owned 
and non State-owned companies (for instance, Dewenter  and Malatesta  
[2001], Wei, Varela and Hassan [2002]), or to compare the performance of 
privatized companies before and after the privatization (for instance, 
Villalonga  [2000] Harper [2001] Boubakri and Cosset [2002], Sun, Jia and 
Tong [2002] Bortolotti, D’Souza, Fantini and Megginson [2002], 
Boardman, Laurin and Vining [2003], Wei, Varela , D’Souza  and Hassan 
[2003], Alexandre and Charreaux [2005]).  In both cases accounting 
numbers are used, introducing biases caused by earnings management and 
differences in accounting standards, both between industries and between 
countries. Like Wei and Varela [2003] in their analysis of China’s privatized 
firms, we use market prices instead of accounting numbers, for two reasons: 
the conceptual superiority of market prices and the plain fact that the 
Portuguese data set (such as the French data set in Dumontier and Laurin 
[2003]) offers market prices for the companies, both at the nationalization 
date and after privatization.  
 
3. Data 
Our sample includes all the Portuguese companies that were nationalized 
that meet the following criteria: 
 
1. a listing in Lisbon at the time of their nationalization; and  
2. a (second) initial public offer as the first (eventually only) 
privatization offer. 
 
These criteria can be met by companies that undertook restructuring 
(mergers or similar operations) while under State-ownership and by 
companies that returned to the market in their original form. The State 
cherry-picked the companies to be relisted from the larger set of companies 
that had been nationalised in 1975 and 1976. These relatively large and 
well-known new listings played a decisive role in the uplift of the Lisbon 
Exchange to developed market status, granted by Morgan Stanley in 1997. 
 
Table 1 shows the size of the sample. 
 _ TAKE IN TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
The 34 nationalizations of public companies that were reversed triggered 16 
privatizations, whose initial offers took place between 1989 and 1997. In 
1989 only one of the three companies (Banco Totta & Açores) that re-
entered the market did so under the same name and without undergoing any 
corporate restructuring. A comeback to the equity market in an unchanged 
format occurred only once again, with Banco Espírito Santo in 1991. The 
remaining 14 privatizations (five insurers, Tranquilidade, Aliança, Bonança, 
Mundial-Confiança and Império, a brewer, Centralcer, five banks, 
Português do Atlântico , UBP, Crédito Predial, Fomento and Pinto & Sotto 
Mayor, a cement producer, Cimpor, a pulp producer, Portucel, and the 
electrical utility EDP) were offers of companies that had resulted from 
mergers. Our sample comprises all the offerings that meet our requirements, 
with the exception of the Tranquilidade offer because the privatized 
Tranquilidade resulted from the merger of the original Tranquilidade and 
two smaller insurers, Garantia Funchalense and A Nacional, of which only 
A Nacional was listed in 1974, and with a marginal market capitalization. 
This makes Tranquilidade substantially dissimilar to a “second” initial 
public offering. The statistics of the remaining 15 offers are posted in table 
2.    
 
_ TAKE IN TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE – 
 
The dependence of the value of indemnities paid in Portuguese 
nationalizations on payment means is addressed in a detailed fashion in 
Alpalhão (2010). Portuguese indemnities following the 1974-5 
nationalizations were set using as basis the weighted average of audited 
book value as at the last year before nationalisation (weight of 85 per cent) 
and the average
[3]
 of high and low stock prices for each of the years between 
1964 and 1974 (weight of 15 per cent). Indemnities were paid in cash only 
up to the amount of 50,000$00 PTE
[4]
 (Portuguese Escudos, the Portuguese 
currency at the time), and all amounts above that value entitled stockholders 
to receive tradable governments bonds, called TNE, the acronym of  Títulos 
de Nacionalização e Expropriação (“nationalisation and expropriation 
securities”). TNE paid interest, accrued since the nationalisation date and 
computed at rates varying inversely with the absolute indemnity value, with 
a maximum of 13.5 per cent and a minimum of 2.5 per cent (applicable to 
indemnities above PTE 6,050,000$00
[5]
). Market rates, at the time, were in 
the vicinity of 15% (Valério [2001]). 
 
Taking the nominal value of indemnities as metric, the mean indemnity was 
of almost precisely three billion PTE
[6]
, with a huge range between the 
maximum of almost thirteen billion (the electrical utility EDP) and a 
minimum of 195 million (the insurer Aliança). If, on the other hand, we take 
the weighted average indemnity using the weights of the thirteen different 
series of TNE issued (see Alpalhão [2010] for details), these figures are 
reduced by 54%, taking into account the fact that the present value of most 
TNE was severely below their respective nominal value, due to the very 
modest interest rates most of these securities carried.  
 
These companies spent on average 214 months private, with a small range 
between a minimum of 174 months (the first privatization, the Totta & 
Açores bank) and a maximum of 270 months (EDP). This time frame is 
much bigger than in American SIPO, documented in Muscarella and 
Vetsuypens (1989) to be of 34 months (for a sample of 74 SIPO that took 
place in the United States between 1976 and 1983), in Cao and Lerner 
(2009) to be of 82 months (for a sample of  496 American SIPO between 
1980 and 2002) and in Cao (2009) to be of 45 months (in this case for a 
sample of 594 American SIPO, these taking place from 1981 to 2006). 
 
The mean privatization’s size was of 56 billion PTE (19 times the value of 
indemnities, at nominal value), and the biggest’s (EDP) size was of 391 
billion PTE (31 times the value of nominal indemnities). The average 
market value of privatized companies, at first trading day closing, was of 
199 billion PTE (66 times the indemnities), with a maximum of 1.9 trillion 
PTE accounted for by EDP, that closed at a price corresponding 
approximately to 145 times the value of indemnities paid to the shareholders 
of the nationalized companies merged into EDP. 
 
_ TAKE IN TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE – 
Comparing the mean (and median) value of indemnities with the offer 
values and post-offer equity values we can, generally, conclude statistically 
(see table 3) that the amounts paid by the Republic to the former 
shareholders were lower than the public offer prices, as well as than the 
post-offer equity values. From table 3  the attractive results of the 
privatization offers are visible, namely from the Portuguese capital market 
development point of view, one of the stated goals of the Portuguese 
privatizations. The mean (and median) post-offer equity values were 
consistently higher than the amounts of the public offers.    
 
4. Value changes 
We compute the value change of the nationalized companies during their 
time as private companies as 
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where V
O
j is the value of company j using the offer price and the denominator 
is the pre-privatization State investment in company j, adding the indemnities 
paid by the State and the net investment during the period between the 
nationalization and the privatization offer. NjZPj is the value of the 
indemnities paid to the shareholders of company j, δj  is a factor that 
represents the net investment in the company during its years as a private 
(1) 
company, RBTAj  represents the mean monthly return on the BTA index 
between the dates when indemnities were set for share j  and its first 
privatization offer (which we define as the Republic’s opportunity cost for its 
investment in nationalized shares), and Ej is the number of months from the 
nationalization and the first privatization offer of company j.  
The relevant net investment (GAFEEP [1995], Vilar [1998]) in the companies 
when private is given by the Republic’s cash outflow to the nationalized 
companies derived from its shareholders status (that is, without taking into 
account subsidies and compensations paid to nationalized companies that 
rendered public services, as well as debt for shares swaps and debt 
guarantees) and dividends paid to the Republic by the nationalized 
companies. 
In percentage of indemnities, 
 
δj = δ
1
j – δ
2
j       
where δ
1
j and δ
2
j represent, respectively, the Republic’s cash out-flow due to 
its shareholder status and the dividends paid to the Republic. 
Since this information is not available for each company every year, we take 
δj = δ, j , and compute δ using the data documented in Vilar (1998) for the 
period 1978-1997 (table 4). 
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On average, the Republic’s net investment, after nationalizations, was 89.3% 
higher than the amount spent in indemnities, making δ=1.893. 
ΔVj represents the annual return on the shares of the j-th company to be 
nationalized and privatized (in a Ej months holding period). A suitable 
benchmark for this return is the market portfolio’s return, as usually used to 
assess the returns of private equity investments (Kaplan and Schoar’s [2005] 
public market equivalent). The fact that we are analyzing returns in private 
companies makes the calculation of excess returns, that is, the difference 
between the annual return on the shares of the j-th company and its expected 
return, using for example the capital asset pricing model, infeasible. We 
therefore define the market return in the same holding period as ΔVBTAj as 
(2) 
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This translates, for each company, in the growth of an investment in the BTA 
index between the indemnity payment date (IBTA
Z
j) and the privatization date 
(IBTA
V
j)
[7]
. We use this return to discount the values of the net investment in 
each company, that, for lack of more precise data, we assume occurred in the 
mid point of the private company period.  
Indemnities were paid on December 16, 1978 (banks and insurance 
companies) and May 25, 1979 (non financial companies). The last 
privatization offer in our sample – EDP – took place on June 16, 1997. The 
time series of the BTA index during these nineteen years (figure 1) posts very 
clearly the profile of a (re)emerging market, status that the Lisbon Exchange 
held, in the Morgan Stanley Capital International definition, until precisely 
December 2, 1997, less than  six months after the EDP offer. 
_ TAKE IN FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE – 
 
On the eve of the setting of the indemnities to be paid to banks and insurers’ 
shareholders, the index value was 60.9, 32.5% below its opening value (90.2 
as at April 1, 1977). On the day of the EDP offer, the BTA stood at 4330.2, 
36.4% below its all-time high of October 6, 1987, immediately before the 
interview of Prime Minister Aníbal Cavaco Silva to the Portuguese National 
Television where he commented that “cats were being sold for the price of 
hares”[8] on the Lisbon Exchange. 
We define the abnormal return on the j-th company as 
ΔVAj =ΔVj  – ΔVBTAj    
ΔVj, ΔVBTAj and ΔVAj  values for the sample are posted in table 5. 
_ TAKE IN TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE – 
 
During a period of high volatility, the Portuguese Republic’s performance as 
equity investor and manager was lacklustre, both in absolute terms and 
relatively to the public market equivalent. No offer posts a positive value 
change. The mean (and the median) of the offers presents a negative change 
of -6.81% (-6.63%), both statistically significant at the 1% level. That is, the 
State did not even recover capital invested in indemnities and subsequent 
investments in nationalized companies. Additionally, but confirming the 
fragile investments done by the Portuguese State, the portfolio mean 
(4) 
(3) 
(abnormal return is clearly negative (-29.84% unweighted and -28.25% 
weighted) and different from zero at the 1% significance level. 
A negative value for this return is consistent with the generalized empirical 
evidence of post-privatization performance improvement, although the source 
of negative returns may not be totally due to inefficient management, taking 
into account privatization pricing tactics and market conditions at the time of 
the privatization offers. 
In the French case, Dumontier and Laurin (2003) document a return only 
slightly below zero (-0.25%), pointing to a negligible value destruction. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens’ (1990) work on American SIPO documents an 
absolute return of 268.4%, much above the Portuguese numbers, but not 
significantly different from zero after adjustment for leverage and market 
returns. 
 
5. Conclusion 
We can conclude that the Portuguese citizens, as indirect investors in the 
nationalized companies, earned a return much lower than the one available to 
them through a passive investment in the Portuguese market portfolio, and 
also lower than the returns earned in comparable international cases. The 
Portuguese Republic did a poor job as an LBO specialist. 
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 Table 1 
 Nationalizations of public companies later privatized in public offers  
Year Nationalizations  % Privatizations  % Of which without 
restructuring: 
1974 1 3    
1975 33 97    
1989   3 19 1 
1990   2 12.5 0 
1991   2 12.5 1 
1992   3 19 0 
1993   1 6 0 
1994   3 19 0 
1995   1 6 0 
1997   1 6 0 
Total 34 100 16 100 2 
This table reports the time series of the Portuguese nationalizations of public 
companies that were later privatized in public offers. In share issue privatizations 
made through several offers in different moments in time, the reported year is the one 
of the first offer. 
 Table 2 
 Offer characteristics   
Privatization 
Indemnity 
(1) 
Indemnity 
(2) 
Indemnity 
(3) 
Months as 
private co.      Offer size 
Post- offer Equity 
Value  
Aliança Seguradora 194.778 55.514 89.660 177 7.106.787 18.900.000 
Banco de Fomento  3.705.946 1.056.244 1.705.910 241 19.408.258 109.600.000 
Banco Espírito Santo 2.725.052 776.676 1.254.388 199 60.866.056 164.000.000 
Banco Totta & Açores 1.558.845 444.292 717.563 174 28.595.573 92.500.000 
Bonança 649.089 184.999 298.787 198 18.835.677 24.000.000 
Centralcer 1.078.900 307.501 496.636 185 34.585.135 35.150.000 
Cimpor 4.584.786 1.306.726 2.110.454 233 39.610.032 245.000.000 
Crédito Pr. Português 1.234.496 351.848 568.259 216 40.824.057 42.500.000 
Electricidade de Port. 12.792.026 3.645.899 5.888.386 270 391.477.500 1.860.000.000 
Império 827.124 235.741 380.739 215 25.512.186 28.000.000 
Mundial-Confiança 434.580 123.861 200.045 208 33.440.519 32.000.000 
Pinto & Sotto Mayor 3.280.782 935.067 1.510.199 240 37.383.200 36.600.000 
Portucel 1.442.276 411.068 663.904 245 35.646.000 92.220.000 
Português do Atlântico 3.151.346 898.176 1.450.618 192 49.752.694 154.000.000 
União de Bancos Port. 7.374.501 3.818.693 3.394.608 218 24.419.401 48.000.000 
Mean 3.002.302   970.154   1.382.010   214   56.497.538   198.831.333   
Median 1.558.845   444.292   717.563   215   34.585.135   48.000.000   
Standard deviation 3.318.962 1.181.931 1.527.774 28 93.587.246 464.121.905 
Maximum 12.792.026   3.818.693   5.888.386   270   391.477.500   1.860.000.000   
Minimum 194.778   55.514   89.660   174   7.106.787   18.900.000   
This table reports the characteristics of 15 public share offers of (previously public) nationalized companies or of 
companies resulting from mergers of (previously public) nationalized companies. Indemnities (1), (2) and (3) 
quantify, respectively, the indemnities paid at the nominal value of indemnities, with TNE class XII and with the 
weighted average, with chapter 2 weights. Post-offer equity value is the market capitalization of outstanding shares 
at the close price of the first trading day. All values are in thousands of Portuguese Escudos. 
Table 3 
 Offer characteristics – Hypothesis Tests   
  Mean Tests (t-student) 
Median Tests (U Test - Mann 
Whitney) 
Null Hypothesis t-stat p-value U-stat p-value 
µI1 = µO  -2,21 0,04 21,01 0,00 
µI1 = µPO -1,63 0,11 21,77 0,00 
µI2 = µO  -2,30 0,03 21,77 0,00 
µI2 = µPO -1,65 0,11 21,77 0,00 
µI3 = µO  -2,28 0,03 21,77 0,00 
µI3 = µPO -1,65 0,11 21,77 0,00 
µO = µPO -1,16 0,25 3,26 0,07 
 This table compares means (and medians) of indemnities of nationalized firms with the results of firms´s 
privatization (offer size and post-offer equity value). µI1, µI2, µI3, µO, and µPO are respectively means (medians) of 
indemnities, offer size and post-offer equity value.  
 Table 4  
Cash flows to and from the Republic and nationalized companies 
Item Billion PTE, 1997 prices % of indemnities 
Indemnities for nationalizations 676 100 
Investment in the nationalized companies 2172 321,3 
Dividends paid to the Republic 892 132,0 
Balance 1280 189,3 
This table reports cash flows to and from the Republic and nationalized companies, between 1978 and 
1997. The Republic’s investment is total cash outflow minus subsidies, compensations for public services 
rendered, equity for debt swaps and debt guarantees. Data are from Vilar (1998). 
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Figure 1: BTA Index, 15-12-1978 to 16-06-97 (source: MC Corretagem) 
Table 5  
Statistics for the nationalized companies’ value changes  
during their time as private companies 
Company ΔVj ΔVBTAj ΔVAn 
Aliança Seguradora -0,7% 31,9% -32,6% 
Banco de Fomento e Exterior -7,2% 21,2% -28,5% 
Banco Espírito Santo -5,3% 24,2% -29,5% 
Banco Pinto & Sotto Mayor -10,4% 21,4% -31,8% 
Banco Português do Atlântico -6,6% 25,1% -31,7% 
Banco Totta & Açores -6,9% 29,1% -36,0% 
Bonança -6,6% 24,4% -31,0% 
Centralcer -9,7% 24,9% -34,5% 
Cimpor -6,0% 20,5% -26,5% 
Crédito Predial Português -8,4% 20,1% -28,6% 
Electricidade de Portugal -0,4% 20,0% -20,4% 
Império -9,0% 20,2% -29,2% 
Mundial-Confiança -3,9% 22,7% -26,5% 
Portucel -3,9% 19,6% -23,5% 
União de Bancos Portugueses -17,2% 20,1% -37,3% 
Arithmetic mean -6,81% 23,03% -29,84% 
t-stat (p-value) - 6.44 (0.00)  -25.49 (0.00) 
Wilcoxon T-statistic (p-value) 3.38 (0.00)  3.38 (0.00) 
Weighted mean -6,78% 21,47% -28,25% 
Median -6,63% 21,38% -29,50% 
Standard deviation 4,09% 3,63% 4,53% 
Maximum  -0,36% 31,90% -20,40% 
Minimum -17,16% 19,62% -37,30% 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of the nationalized companies value change 
during their operation as private companies, both gross and deducted from the return 
on the BTA index. The weights in the weighted average are mean indemnities, as in 
Alpalhão (2010). 
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1 One exception is Hayek (1944). 
2 Although Megginson and Netter (2001) name the sale of a minority share in Volkswagen by the German government of Konrad Adenauer, 
in 1961, as the first privatization.  It should be noted that this shareholding returned to State ownership four years later, and, unlike the 
BP offer, did not mark the beginning of an era of massive and worldwide sale of State-owned companies to the public. Bel (2007) places 
the first privatizations quite before, in the thirties in Nazi Germany. Megginson and Netter (2003), and Burke (1998), prefer to give the 
pioneering place to the denationalization of steel and coal in the United Kingdom in the early fifties. For an interesting discussion of the 
coining of the term “privatization” itself, Bel (2006). 
3 For unlisted companies this value was to be replaced by a so-called “capital value”, computed as a multiple of declared dividends. 
4 €1,00 = 200,482 PTE. This being the case, 50 thousand PTE equals approximately €250,00. 
5 Approximately €1,21 million. 
6 Roughly €5 million. 
7 The BTA Index, published by Banco Totta & Açores, became, after the Lisbon Exchange reopening in the seventies, the market’s most 
popular benchmark, replacing in that role the Bank of Portugal Index. 
8 A popular Portuguese saying meaning, in this case, stock prices well above their fundamentals. Aníbal Cavaco Silva, Prime Minister at the 
time and the President of the Portuguese Republic at the time of writing, was a Public Finance Professor and had been a very successful 
Finance Minister before becoming Prime Minister. His views on economic and financial issues were (and still are) widely respected. 
